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Abstract
Online businesses collect a wealth of data on customers, often without properly 
informing them. Increasingly, these data can be used for behavioral price discrimi-
nation. In this two-study article, we explore how consumers would respond if busi-
nesses were compelled to disclose their use of discriminatory behavioral pricing 
techniques. Using different disclosure frames, we examine the effects of disclosure 
on purchase intention and purchase probability. The findings indicate that specific 
disclosure frames affect purchase intentions. Furthermore, we find that a disclosure 
frame that is more in line with a consumer’s self-interest increases purchase inten-
tion. Specifically, the frame indirectly influences intention to purchase through its 
effect on the perception that the use of behavioral pricing information serves self-
interest. In this way, our study draws attention to a potentially unanticipated effect 
of regulatory intervention. Implications for future research and legal policy are dis-
cussed, focused on the need to design and empirically test the effectiveness of dis-
closures online.
Keywords Personalized pricing · Behavioral price discrimination · Mandatory 
disclosure · Warning frames · Information regulation · Privacy
Introduction
Online traders have a wealth of information on their customers which they may pro-
cess and use to the advantage of their customers. They can, however, also use it to 
their own commercial advantage. Indeed, some have argued that traders will exploit 
any opportunity to take advantage of psychological or informational weakness of 
consumers, if necessary by use of manipulation and deception (Akerlof & Shiller, 
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2015). Currently, with the advent of sophisticated techniques for building customer 
profiles, opportunities for such practices abound. These techniques allow online 
businesses to make personalized offers to their customers, both in terms of what 
is offered and the price of the offer. One of these practices, discriminatory behav-
ioral pricing, involves the use of customer profiling techniques in online business-
to-consumer (B2C) commerce to set a personalized reservation price that optimally 
captures the price a customer is willing to pay and which in reality may be lower or 
higher than the prices offered to others (Gelbrich, 2011; Kannan & Kopalle, 2001).
As an effective form of direct (first-degree) price discrimination, personalized 
behavioral pricing was found to boost a seller’s profits at the expense of the con-
sumers (Esteves & Resende, 2019). Customers are typically unaware of the use of 
this technique, as is the case with several other (one-to-one) marketing practices 
(Baker, Dickinson, & Hollander, 1986; Gelbrich, 2011; Goodwin, 1991; Rust, 
Kannan, & Peng, 2002). However, the difference with the more common dynamic 
pricing practices based on differential factors such as day and time of sale is that 
behavioral price discrimination enables traders to offer an individualized price to 
individual customers based on their personal behavioral profile, not on whether the 
general demand for the item on sale is higher or lower at a given point in time. When 
informed of dynamic pricing practices, consumers may appreciate that the price 
they pay is higher because of a surge in demand at particular times of the day (Kah-
neman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Martin, Ponder, & Lueg, 2009). Yet, they may be 
less understanding if they discover that the behavioral price they pay for exactly the 
same product on the exact same date and time is higher than that paid by other con-
sumers for the mere reason that computer algorithms can discretely estimate who is 
less price sensitive or has more to spend. These consumers may then feel tricked and 
abused if they became aware of these differentials.
Indeed, the literature on perceived price fairness consistently and convincingly 
shows that individuals develop negative emotions and distrust toward businesses 
that engage in discriminatory pricing practices (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). Per-
ceived fairness, trust and repurchase decisions of disadvantaged consumers’ are neg-
atively affected (Garbarino & Maxwell, 2010; Grewal, Hardesty, & Gopalkrishnan, 
2004; Haws & Bearden, 2006), whereas advantaged consumers tend to experience a 
host of both positive and negative emotions (Gelbrich, 2011). Hence, discriminatory 
behavioral pricing practices may erode trust in online commerce as a whole (Office 
of Fair Trading, 2013), and customer privacy in particular (Rust et al., 2002). This 
erosion could justify regulatory intervention (Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2014).
Currently, in European law there is no rule that requires identical prices to be 
offered to consumers in online sales apart from the prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of, for example, gender. Moreover, there is no specific rule demanding that 
the use of personal profiles for the purpose of price-setting is disclosed to customers 
(Rott, 2015). The general goal of the European legal framework for consumer pro-
tection is to enable consumers to make so-called informed transactional decisions; 
it prohibits commercial practices that withhold material information needed by the 
average consumer to take such decisions and thereby cause or potentially cause the 
average consumer to take a transactional decision that s/he would not have taken 
otherwise (art. 7 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC). Therefore, if 
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there is strong evidence that consumers who are given information on the use of 
behavioral price discrimination respond substantially differently from those who are 
not, there may be a case for regulatory intervention at a European level. One impor-
tant legal issue concerns the question whether we deem it fair and just that online 
prices may vary depending on seemingly irrelevant criteria without proper notifica-
tion to customers.
In regulatory terms, the exposure of covert discriminatory behavioral pricing 
practices, by bringing them explicitly to the attention of the customer when entering 
the online purchasing process, may address some of the ‘failures of privacy self-
management’ identified in the current consent practice (Solove, 2013). As observed 
by (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015), while privacy concerns are not 
always at the forefront of consumers’ minds, when prompted they do display con-
cerns about their privacy and they act accordingly. However, previous work on 
information regulation also shows that informing individuals ex-ante that they are 
about to be ‘defaulted’ or ‘nudged’ does not necessarily alter the impact of defaults, 
nor does informing them ex-post (Loewenstein, Bryce, Hagmann, & Rajpal, 2015). 
So, whether information regulation can influence market behavior when consumers 
are discriminated through the online customization of prices is still a much-debated 
issue. What is clear, however, is that with the spread of big data in marketing, the 
issue whether regulatory intervention is warranted is likely to become increasingly 
urgent (Seizov, Wulf, & Luzak, 2019). One of the obvious regulatory options would 
then be to introduce some form of mandatory disclosure to consumers. The rationale 
for mandated behavioral price discrimination disclosure would be that it empowers 
consumers to act on the information given, to decide whether they feel comfortable 
with such practices and to shop elsewhere if they do not. The question then arises as 
to what would be the actual effect of a disclosure statement? And, more in particu-
lar, would that effect depend on how the statement is framed? It is these two ques-
tions that we explore in this article.
In this article, we investigate how the framing of disclosure messages influences 
consumer attitudes and purchase intentions in an online shopping context. This is 
important from a practical point of view as regulatory interventions in online sale 
processes tend to depart from the neoclassic economic information paradigm. In 
Europe at least, information regulation seldom takes form, timing, framing and 
phrasing of the disclosure into account. Instead, disclosure duties tend to be for-
mulated in open-textured phrases which leave ample leeway to businesses to use 
the frame which is best aligned with their commercial interest. Also, to our knowl-
edge, no research has been conducted on whether the frame of a disclosure state-
ment impacts the intended effect of the intervention. So, we seek to apply behavioral 
regulation insights in a mainstream information economics setting. In doing so, we 
explore the disclosure effect on purchase intention in a multi-attribute compositional 
trade-off context.
From random utility theory (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; McFadden, 1974), it 
can be derived that purchase intentions are based on additive utility. This implies 
that purchase intentions are not derived from a product per se, but from the different 
characteristics a product possesses (Lancaster, 1966; Vodopivec, 1992). As a con-
sequence, purchase intention is driven by trading off multiple product attributes. By 
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applying these insights in a setting involving disclosure statements, the empirical 
challenge of the study is to systematically manipulate multiple independent factors 
(i.e., product attributes) to elicit preferences for combinations of attribute (level)s. 
To achieve this, we use conjoint analysis, a stated preference elicitation method that 
is widely accepted in the marketing research community (Green, Krieger, & Wind, 
2001), in which a range of fractional factorial arrays are applied to measure inten-
tion to purchase.
Framing of Disclosures
Markets are complex environments for consumers. Both informational ‘noise,’ 
which causes obfuscation and overload, and classic information asymmetries chal-
lenge consumers to compare offerings. Indeed, economic theory posits that where 
market actors fail to disclose essential information, the resulting asymmetries cause 
market failure (Radner, 1968). Mazis, Staelin, Beales and Salop (1981, p. 12) argue 
that ‘when any informational market failure exists, i.e., when consumer decisions 
(signals) are based on false or limited information,’ information regulation may be 
appropriate. In this light, a Pareto improving intervention such as a mandated dis-
closure of information serves to rectify asymmetries, to support informed consent in 
contract making decisions and to enhance competition (OECD, 2010; Ogus, 2004). 
European consumer law has thus developed numerous precontractual information 
duties (OECD, 2010). However, this line of legal thinking does not overly concern 
itself with how and when such information is filtered, phrased, framed and offered 
by the information provider, or received, processed and converted into action by the 
bounded receiver. Meanwhile, under influence of the behavioral sciences (e.g., psy-
chology, marketing), our understanding of information processing by individuals 
has become more refined (Koehler & Harvey, 2008; Statt, 1998). Several of these 
insights are relevant for our purposes.
One of the findings is that in written communication on a particular phenom-
enon, the effectiveness of the information is dependent on the context in which it is 
given. That is, information needs to be both comprehensible and specific in terms 
of the operative mechanism and the exact nature of the phenomenon involved in 
order to enable the receiver to assess both the content and implications of the mes-
sage (Wogalter, 1999, 2006). The mere fact that information concerning a particular 
phenomenon is offered by a provider as well as received, perceived and processed 
by a receiver does not automatically cause the receiver to change attitudes and adapt 
behavior. It is the context (e.g., when, how, at what stage) in which the actual mes-
sage operates that matters, as does the poignancy (i.e., the degree of mental appeal) 
of the message on the potential (adverse) consequences of the phenomenon (Pape, 
2011). That is, varying the poignancy by varying the information disclosure framing 
can elicit varied behavioral responses in the receiver (i.e., consumer).
Another relevant insight is that while in markets with a discriminatory or person-
alized pricing regime purchase intentions are impacted by perceptions of price fair-
ness (Darke & Dahl, 2003; Maxwell & Garbarino, 2010; Richards, Liaukonyte, & 
Streletskaya, 2016; Riquelme, Román, Cuestas, & Iacobucci, 2019); the literature on 
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price framing also shows that when comparing prices consumers tend to ‘only base 
their decisions on the salient characteristics of the situation rather than on the objec-
tive price information’ (Bayer & Ke 2013, p. 215). This price-framing effect is sup-
ported by previous marketing research, such as Inman, McAlister and Hoyer (1990) 
who suggest that the promotion signal can be sufficient for consumers to choose the 
promoted product, independent of the relative price information.
We integrate the studies on information processing, perceived price fairness and 
price framing. Drawing from procedural justice (e.g., Maxwell, 2002) and social 
norm theory (e.g., Garbarino & Maxwell, 2010), we expect that purchase intention is 
impacted when the rules used to set a personalized price are disclosed, but that this 
effect is specific to the industry or market (Maxwell & Garbarino, 2010; Xia et al., 
2004) ‘as perceptions of justice are made relative to social norms that have evolved 
differently from one context to the next’ (Richards et al., 2016, p.140). Furthermore, 
combining the notions of ‘self-interested inequity aversion’ (Liaukonyte, Richards, 
Kaiser, & Rickard 2015; Richards et al., 2016) and salience in price framing (Bayer 
& Ke, 2013), we also expect that this disclosure effect is asymmetric and situational. 
That is, in a market where consumers are used to paying different prices (Garba-
rino & Maxwell, 2010), an information disclosure that indicates the procedure used 
to personalize prices—regardless of the clarity and concreteness of its frame, will 
impact intention to purchase if it is perceived to be in line with self-interest.
Thus, to examine this information disclosure framing effect, we conducted an 
experimental study wherein we exposed participants in an online hotel booking 
experience context to a disclosure message in which the salience of the self-interest 
was varied through a clear and concrete indication of the behavioral pricing mecha-
nism in operation, or a more ambiguous indication of the behavioral mechanisms 
used.
Having described the rationale for examining disclosure framing effects, we now 
will introduce the design of our study and the research methods that we used. After 
we have discussed the results from our main experiment, we also discuss our ‘Post 
Hoc experiment,’ in which we addressed the replicability of the main study. After 
having presented both experiments, we discuss our findings, the associated theoreti-
cal and policy implications, as well as limitations and directions for future research.
Methods
Experimental Design
Our design consisted of five between-subjects conditions. Four different experi-
mental groups were exposed to a disclosure statement. The fifth condition was a 
control group condition that was not exposed to a disclosure statement. To vary 
the salience of the self-interest, two unambiguous and two ambiguous frames were 
chosen. In line with ‘self-interested inequity aversion’ research, one unambiguous 
inadvantageous (i.e., the price paid is ‘higher’ than others) and one unambiguous 
advantageous (i.e., a ‘lower’ price than others) frame was formulated. As the two 
equitable (i.e., neutral) but ambiguous disclosure frames, one ‘higher/lower’ and one 
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‘appropriate’ information disclosure was developed. Table  1 shows the disclosure 
messages that were presented to participants in the experimental groups:
In European law, information disclosure duties tend to be formulated in open-
textured phrases. For instance, certain information is to be given in a ‘clear and 
prominent’ or ‘comprehensible manner’ (art. 5 and 8 Consumer Rights Direc-
tive 2011/83/EC) or may not be given ‘in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or 
untimely manner’ (art. 7 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC). Such 
broadly phrased standards leave businesses ample leeway to use the frame which is 
best aligned with their commercial interests, and, therefore, there is every reason to 
test more specified forms of disclosure wordings. This is exactly what we aimed for 
with the frames chosen for the experiment.
Sample Characteristics
Data were collected through an online questionnaire, and the responses were 
recorded using Sawtooth survey software. The participants were students from a 
large Dutch university; a student sample was preferred to ensure response homo-
geneity (Peterson, 2001). A total of 426 students participated. Over a period of 
6 weeks, students were randomly invited to participate at different moments of the 
day in different locations by four trained research assistants carrying iPads on which 
they presented the information. Students were also invited to participate by e-mail; 
they then participated in the experiment via their computer (way of sampling did not 
affect the results obtained). The sample included 152 men (35.7%) and 274 women 
(64.3%), with an average age of 21.9 years (SD = 2.9). There was no significant dif-
ference in gender [χ2 (4) = 3.391, p = .495, Φ = .089] and age [F(4, 422) = 0.624, 
p = .646, ɳ2 = .006] between the five groups. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the groups by a randomizer in the software.
Procedures and Measures
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part included two scales—
each rated on a Likert scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly 
Table 1  Overview of disclosure frames per experimental group
Upmost care was given to the translation of the disclosure messages in this article. The original texts 
were in Dutch, the native language of the participants
Label Disclosure message
Higher Our website determines the price you are offered on the basis of your previous purchasing 
behavior. Your price is therefore higher than the price offered to others
Higher/lower Our website determines the price you are offered on the basis of your previous purchasing 
behavior. Your price is therefore higher or lower than the price offered to others
Appropriate Our website uses your buying habits to make you offers and to offer you an appropriate 
price
Lower Our website determines the price you are offered on the basis of your previous purchasing 
behavior. Your price is therefore lower than the price offered to others
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agree)—to measure attitude toward trust (Cronbach’s α = 0.73) and loyalty (Cron-
bach’s α = 0.83). Trust was measured using five items (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 
1994): ‘Most people are honest,’ ‘Most people are trustworthy,’ ‘Most people are 
good and kind,’ ‘Most people are trustful of the intentions of others,’ ‘I am trustful.’ 
Loyalty included: ‘If I choose a certain product, I will remain loyal to the brand,’ ‘I 
find it important to stay true to brands or products,’ ‘I find it difficult to buy a prod-
uct from another brand once I have the choice made for a specific brand,’ ‘I strongly 
identify myself with the products that I purchase,’ ‘I find it important to remain 
faithful to brands or products.’ Trust and loyalty are reported in the literature as 
predictors of purchase intention (Bonsón Ponte, Carvajal-Trujillo, & Escobar-Rod-
ríguez, 2015; McCole, Ramsey, & Williams, 2010). They were measured to verify 
that the control and experimental groups did not differ in levels of trust and loyalty. 
Utilizing choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis methodology, the second part com-
prised 12 CBC tasks, of which 11 random tasks (in which three hotel concepts were 
randomly varied per participant per task) served to estimate the individual attribute 
level part-worths/utilities of the participants, and one fixed (holdout) task was used 
(in which three fixed hotel concepts were equal for all participants; placed between 
random tasks four and five) to measure the intention to purchase (on a Likert scale) 
as well as the probability to purchase (derived from the total individual utility per 
fixed hotel concept of each participant). Before starting with the CBC tasks, all par-
ticipants received the same instruction: to make an online hotel reservation for a 
local festivity well known to the participants. In addition, the experimental groups 
(not the control group) received a disclosure message (condition). The execution of 
each CBC task involved answering the following question: ‘If you were considering 
booking the hotel, which would you choose?’ For task complexity, level overlap, 
and design efficiency purposes, three concepts (i.e., options) were given per (ran-
dom/fixed) choice task. Each concept represented a hotel choice involving the four 
most preferred hotel attributes: star category, review rating, distance to city center 
and price (Kim, Kim, King, & Heo, 2019). Table 2 provides an illustration of such 
choice task, the fixed (holdout) task, with a luxury (highest attribute levels), mid-
range (middle attribute levels) and economy (lowest attribute levels) concept (i.e., 
hotel options one, two, and three).
When stating the preferred choice in the fixed (equal for all) CBC task, partici-
pants were asked to indicate intention to purchase and perceived price fairness on 
a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The third part of the 
Table 2  Fixed choice-based 
conjoint choice task
If you were considering booking the hotel, which would you 
choose?
Star category 4-star 2-star 3-star
Review rating Fantastic: 9+ Acceptable: 6+ Very good: 8+
Distance to center 0.1 km 3.3 km 1.7 km
Price € 111.80 € 63.20 € 89.90
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questionnaire included a brief survey on the socio-demographics gender and age, 
as well as a question to check if the participants remembered the condition. As a 
final question for each of the disclosure messages, participants were asked whether 
they considered it fair if a booking site utilized the discriminatory behavioral pricing 
policy.
To explore the effects of information disclosure on purchase intention in light of 
all possible combinations of hotel attribute levels (i.e., not only those attribute com-
binations that were shown in the three concepts of the fixed task), the eleven ran-
dom CBC tasks were thus added to create an additional indirect measure of inten-
tion to purchase. It should be noted that there are two viewpoints on how to design 
CBC studies: (1) fixed orthogonal designs (i.e., a single version of the choice tasks 
is shown to all participants, or subsets of tasks are shown to different groups of par-
ticipants); and (2) controlled random designs (i.e., each participant receives a unique 
set of choice tasks). We chose the latter since it reduces biases (compared to fixed 
designs) resulting from order and learning effects. Also, random designs are more 
robust in the estimation of all possible trade-offs. Importantly, with a fixed design 
we would have been able to measure individual part-worths on a much smaller 
fraction (i.e., 12/167 = 7.19%) of all 500 possible attribute trade-offs (i.e., 5 levels 
[star category] × 4 levels [review rating] × 5 levels [distance to city center] × 5 lev-
els [price] = 5 × 4 × 5 × 5 = 500 attribute trade-off combinations). Given that we pre-
sented three concepts per task, a full profile full-factorial fixed design would have 
resulted in a questionnaire with 500/3 = 167 tasks.
Complete enumeration (i.e., all possible [500] concepts) was chosen as randomi-
zation design strategy. The random selection of (subsets of) all possible combina-
tions of the four attributes per concept/option per task thereby conformed to the 
following design principles: minimal overlap (attribute levels were repeated as few 
times as possible within a single task), level balance (each attribute level was shown 
as equally often as possible) and orthogonality (all pairings of attribute levels shown 
were balanced and uncorrelated). Using the default setting of the specialist CBC 
software (Sawtooth SSI Web 8.3.8), 300 unique sets of 11 random CBC tasks were 
generated. Participants were randomly assigned to each of the 300 task sets.
The individual part-worth (attribute level) utilities were estimated with a Hierar-
chical Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm (Sawtooth CBC/HB 5.5.3). 
As participants could not all be drawn from a single multivariate-normal distri-
bution, given the four different experimental conditions, group membership was 
included as a covariate in the Hierarchical Bayes (HB) run. With the estimated utili-
ties per attribute level per participant, an additive utility model (Fishbein, 1963) was 
used to determine the utility each participant assigned to each of the three hotel con-
cepts in the fixed (“holdout”) task:
where Xki = dummy variable indicates the presence of an attribute level k from a set 
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The total utility per fixed hotel concept per individual then served as input for a 





 = the probability that participant p will choose i from a set. 
Uph = utility that participant p associates with fixed hotel alternative (concept) h. 
Upi = utility that participant p associates with fixed hotel alternative (concept) i. 
Upj = utility that participant p associates with fixed hotel alternative (concept) j.
Using this model, we determined the probability that a participant would pur-
chase a hotel concept in the fixed (equal to all) CBC task. Probability to purchase 
thus served as a second dependent variable, an additional indirect multi-attribute-
level based measure, to explore the effect of the disclosure frame on intention to 
purchase, and to enhance the robustness of the findings.
Data and Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the mean (and SD) values per measure per condition. For each condi-
tion, the intention to purchase (on a Likert scale: 1–7) is provided. Moreover, the 
probability to purchase is given for each of the three options (in percentages: sum-
ming up to 100%). With regard to the percentage weight of each attribute in the 
total preference for a hotel choice, price is the most important attribute in the high 
(M = 27.86%) and high/low (M = 28.43%) conditions, compared to the other condi-
tions, but the difference is insignificant [F(4, 404) = 1.568, p = .182, ɳ2 = .015].
As Table 3 shows, participants disagreed (M409 = 2.03) that, in general, most peo-
ple are trustworthy. Participants also scored low on loyalty (M409 = 2.00). Overall, 
participants did not feel treated fairly when a booking site offered a pricing policy in 
which personal buying habits were used to calculate individualized prices. Participants 
felt treated least fairly when personalized prices were higher (M = 1.74), followed 
by higher/lower (M = 2.33), lower (M = 3.12), and appropriate (M = 3.69). Between 
conditions, significant effects were observed on ‘higher/lower’ pricing policy [F(4, 
393) = 3.234, p = .013, ɳ2 = .032] and ‘lower’ policy [F(4, 393) = 3.109, p = .015, 
ɳ2 = .031], indicating that these policies were not considered equally fair in all five 
conditions. In addition, no significant effects were found regarding the perceived price 
fairness of the chosen (fixed) hotel option [F(4, 404) = 1.363, p = .246, ɳ2 = .013].
Utility Estimates
Prior to using the questionnaire, the CBC design was tested for ordinary least-
squares (OLS) efficiency (Kuhfeld, Tobias, & Garratt, 1994). When compared with a 
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Standard errors remained within limits of less than 0.025 (for main effects) 
and 0.05 (for interaction effects), indicating that the simulated data met the min-
imum sample size and had an acceptable level of precision. To estimate utili-
ties, 150,000 iterations were completed resulting in an acceptable root likelihood 
goodness of fit  (RLHm = 0.8255). Table 4 shows that all utility values were signif-
icant (p < .001). As can be observed, all higher attribute levels have higher utili-
ties (i.e., preference), with the exception of price (i.e., a reversed preference).
Results
Manipulation Check
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to recall which pricing policy 
(none, higher, higher/lower, appropriate, lower) the booking site utilized. The levels 
Table 4  Summary statistics of 
utility estimates
In terms of the interpretation of these values, while it is incorrect 
to compare two single utility values (e.g., 3-star [M = 4.72] does not 
have the same desirability as 1.7 km [M = 4.72]), one can conclude 
that the higher preference for a 3-star hotel, compared to a 2-star 
(M = 4.72 − 2.66 = 2.06), is comparable to the higher preference 
for 0.9  km distance, compared to 1.7  km (M = 6.80 − 4.72 = 2.07). 
The average participant would thus be more or less indiffer-
ent between a 3-star hotel located at 1.7  km from the center 
(M = 4.72 + 4.72 = 9.44) and a 2-star hotel located at 0.9  km 
(M = 2.66 + 6.80 = 9.46)
a Sample means are provided for the full sample (N = 426). Lowest 
attribute level set at 0 (dummy coding), including 1-star hotel***, 
Okay: 6+***, 3.3 km*** and €111.80***. ***p < .001
Attributea Level Utility
Mean SD SE
Star category 5-star hotel 6.482*** 4.812 .233
4-star hotel 5.839*** 4.229 .204
3-star hotel 4.722*** 3.324 .161
2-star hotel 2.658*** 2.062 .099
Review rating Fantastic: 9+ 7.654*** 4.088 .198
Very good: 8+ 6.911*** 3.704 .179
Good: 7+ 4.572*** 2.760 .133
Distance to city center 0.1 km 7.702*** 4.279 .207
0.9 km 6.800*** 3.737 .181
1.7 km 4.722*** 2.783 .134
2.5 km 2.215*** 1.241 .060
Price € 63.20 8.377*** 4.798 .232
€ 76.50 7.319*** 4.012 .194
€ 89.90 5.800*** 2.945 .142
€ 103.10 2.223*** 1.385 .067
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of successful recall were 75.0% (control), 84.6% (higher), 80.0% (higher/lower), 
88.8% (appropriate) and 83.8% (lower). Analysis of the odds ratios using logistic 
regression indicated no significant difference [ R2
Nagelkerke
 = .017, χ2(4) = 4.42, p = .35] 
in recalling the correct pricing policy between the five groups.
Purchase Intentions
To explore whether behavioral pricing disclosure influenced purchase intentions, 
a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with five levels (no dis-
closure message, higher, higher/lower, appropriate, lower), and with intention to 
purchase as dependent variable. This yielded a significant effect on purchase inten-
tions [F(4, 404) = 2.90, p = .022, ɳ2 = .028]. To test for robustness, the analysis was 
repeated on probability to purchase (i.e., the second dependent variable), for the 
luxury hotel concept (option one) [F(4, 404) = 2.88, p = .022, ɳ2 = .028] and the mid-
range concept (option three) [F(4, 404) = 3.12, p = .015, ɳ2 = .030], all of which sup-
ported the effect (N.B. as only seventeen participants—over five groups—chose the 
economy hotel concept (option two), they were excluded from the analysis). In other 
words, the specific information disclosure frame was shown to affect intention to 
purchase. Means relevant for these analyses are given in Table 3.
To further explore the nature of the framing effect, we conducted a planned com-
parison of the control condition (in which no behavioral pricing policy was dis-
closed) with the four experimental conditions. Because Levene’s test of homogene-
ity was significant (p < .05), Hartley’s Fmax test was performed, which satisfied the 
homogeneity of variance assumption (1.81 < 2.04). Planned contrasts revealed that 
having a behavioral pricing disclosure frame significantly affected both intention 
to purchase t(404) = 1.97, p = .049, rc = 0.10, d = 0.20, and probability to purchase 
t(404) = 2.18, p = .029, rc = 0.11, d = 0.22 (option one) and t(404) = 2.38, p = .018, 
rc = 0.12, d = 0.24 (option three). This indicates that, overall, the intention to pur-
chase tended to be higher in the conditions where behavioral pricing information 
was provided when compared to the conditions where it was not. Post hoc compari-
sons (least significant difference tests) were performed which revealed that the mean 
levels of intention to purchase in the control and higher conditions were significantly 
different from the appropriate and lower conditions.
Polynomial trend analyses yielded a more exact understanding of the nature of 
this effect. In order to make these trend analyses meaningful, we ordered the condi-
tions along an assumed continuum of self-interest. The condition where participants 
paid a higher price was considered the least in line with self-interest, then the higher/
lower condition, followed by the appropriate condition, while the lower price was 
considered to be of greatest self-interest. Particularly noteworthy was a significant 
linear trend at F(1, 404) = 10.48, p < .001, ɳ2 = .159, indicating that the content of 
the information disclosure most affected intention to purchase rather than the infor-
mation frame itself. In particular, as the behavioral pricing information was more in 
line with self-interest, the intention to purchase increased. This interpretation was 
further corroborated by the findings that neither quadratic [F(1, 404) = .003, p =.955, 
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ɳ2 = .003] nor cubic [F(1, 404) = 1.17, p =.279, ɳ2 = .053] trends yielded significant 
results, showing that trends deviating from the linear self-interest explanation had 
less predictive power.
Post Hoc Experiment
The study was repeated post hoc to test the self-interest effect, as well as to assess 
the replicability of the experiment under non-EU participants. Two changes were 
made to the design. First, those participants who were shown a disclosure mes-
sage were also asked to state whether the use of information about their purchas-
ing behavior (i.e., the behavioral pricing policy) served their self-interest: ‘When 
using the information about my buying behavior, my interest is served.’ Second, 
for an improved understanding of the ‘appropriate’ condition, a comparison frame 
was included: ‘the price you pay is the same price as offered to others’ (i.e., 
‘same’).
US Participants (n = 186) were recruited through MTurk and received $1.00 for 
completing the questionnaire. Evidence shows that collecting crowdsourced data 
via platforms such as MTurk is highly reliable (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Moreo-
ver, MTurk samples are found to be representative for the US population and strong 
in external validity (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Comparing participants to original 
samples and replication samples, Firth, Hoffman and Wilkinson-Ryan (2017) also 
state that MTurk samples are highly reliable and useful in experimental legal stud-
ies. The participants were American citizens with an average age of 22.7  years 
(SD = 1.8). The sample included eighty-nine men (47.8%) and ninety-seven women 
(52.2%). Among participants, 102 (54.8%) studied and eighty-four (45.2%) did not 
study at college or university level. There was no significant difference in gender 
[χ2 (1) = 0.124, p = .725, Φ = .204] between students and non-students. A small 
but significant age difference [F(1, 185) = 17.796, p < .001, ɳ2 = .088] was found 
between those who studied (M = 22.2, SD = 1.9) and those who did not (M = 23.3, 
SD = 1.7). In addition, there was no significant difference in gender [χ2 (5) = 7.713, 
p = .173, Φ =.204] or age [F(5, 185) = 1.196, p = .313, ɳ2 = .032] between the six 
conditions.
The results of this second study (see Table 5) show that the order of the condi-
tions along the assumed continuum of self-interest (first experimental study) was 
confirmed by the ascending mean values of the perception that the use of informa-
tion about purchasing behavior served self-interest, F(1, 149) = 51.63, p < .001, 
ɳ2 = .263, as was intention to purchase, F(1, 182) = 8.27, p < .01, ɳ2 = .063. More-
over, the (adjusted) mean intentions to purchase of the ‘appropriate’ and ‘same’ 
frames were similar, with a slightly higher (0.15) mean self-interest for ‘same,’ 
indicating that ‘appropriate’ had a similar effect as ‘same.’ Following Hayes and 
Preacher (2014) and Hayes (2018), performing mediation analysis with a multicat-
egorical independent variable using OLS path analysis, the disclosure frame was 
found to indirectly affect intention to purchase through its effect on the percep-
tion that the use of behavioral pricing information served self-interest. The levels 
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of successful recalling, which were 74.2% (higher), 61.8% (higher/lower), 79.2% 
(appropriate), 73.3% (same), 93.1% (lower), did not substantially change the conclu-
sion of the mediation analysis.
Figure 1 and Table 6 illustrate that participants presented with the higher/lower 
disclosure message believed that this behavioral pricing policy was more in line with 
self-interest than those presented with the higher disclosure message (a1 = 0.840). 
A similar effect was found for participants who were presented with the appropri-
ate, the same, or the lower disclosure message (a2 = 1.703, a3 = 1.869, a4 = 2.696). 
Moreover, participants who believed that the behavioral pricing policy was more 
in line with self-interest expressed a stronger intention to purchase (b = 0.089). A 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect (a1b = 0.075, 
a2b = 0.151, a3b = 0.166, a4b = 0.240), based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was 
entirely above zero, with the exception of the higher/lower condition (− 0.000 to 
0.241). There was no evidence that information disclosures affected intention to pur-
chase independent of their effect on the perception that the use of behavioral pricing 
information was in line with self-interest (p < .05).
Table 5  Summary statistics for self-interest serving post hoc experiment
Total sample mean of intention to purchase (N = 188). Ȳ  = adjusted mean, adjusted to the sample mean of 
self-interest (i.e., to reflect the expected difference between the means of the conditions on Y if they were 
equal on the mediator on average)
We report all manipulations, all data exclusions and all measures in our study. Following Hayes and 






Control N = 34 Mean 5.44
SD 1.05
Higher N = 32 Mean 5.47 2.94 5.59
SD 0.80 1.81
Higher/lower N = 36 Mean 5.31 3.78 5.35
SD 0.95 1.71
Appropriate N = 25 Mean 5.68 4.64 5.65
SD 0.80 1.96
Same N = 31 Mean 5.68 4.81 5.63
SD 0.70 1.35
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Fig. 1  Estimated model coefficients for disclosure condition
Table 6  Model coefficients for the self-interest serving post hoc experiment
Since the control condition (N = 34) did not receive a self-interest statement (as there was no disclosure 
message), it was excluded from the mediation analysis (N = 154). The higher condition was chosen as 
reference category as we are interested in the mediating effect of self-interest. That is, we compare the 
disclosure that is least in line with self-interest (akin the findings of study one) with the other disclosures 
(in consecutive order of self-interest), thereby showing that framing influences purchasing intention, in 
particular the extent to which the information hints toward self-interest in purchasing
a p = .0554
b p = .0352
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001









i1 2.938*** i3 5.469*** i2 5.208***
(0.326) (0.144) (0.191)
Higher/lower a1 0.840a c1 −0.163 c′1 − 0.238
(0.435) (0.216) (0.210)
Appropriate a2 1.703** c2 0.211 c′2 0.060
(0.515) (0.218) (0.222)
Same a3 1.869*** c3 0.208 c′3 0.043
(0.409) (0.193) (0.208)




– – b 0.089*b
(0.042)
R2 = 0.263
F(4,149) = 17.70, p < .001
R2 = 0.078
F(4,149) = 3.188, p = .015
R2 = 0.107
F(5,148) = 4.493, 
p < .001




Our results contribute to several areas of research. First, while behavioral pricing 
research has shown that businesses can mitigate the negative perceptions of behav-
ioral price discrimination through price framing (Weisstein, Monroe, & Kukar-Kin-
ney, 2013), this study is first to identify that a behavioral pricing disclosure frame 
can influence intention to purchase. Akin to studies on adverse effects of mandated 
financial information disclosure (Greenstone, Oyer, & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006), 
and, more general, the unintended consequences of regulation (Peltzman, 1975; 
Ribstein, 2002; Sunstein, 1990), our findings indicate that unanticipated framing 
effects of disclosure statements can occur. We show that a frame, which is relatively 
more in line with self-interest, may in fact increase intention to purchase. That is, 
it is the phrasing and framing of disclosure message itself that affects the degree 
to which the use of information about buying behavior is perceived to serve self-
interest, which in turn affects purchase intention. In this way, our findings confirm 
work on salience: when consumers read that an ‘appropriate price’ is offered, they 
do not seem to consider that ‘appropriate’ may also mean that they are being over-
charged. Indeed, they seem to think that they are charged less. And, even when they 
are offered the ‘same’ price as others, they may still think that this is not for ‘all oth-
ers,’ or that they are still better off than a subjective and internally driven reference 
price, indicating that a self-serving bias is at work.
Our findings indicate that by drawing attention to a discriminatory behavio-
ral pricing mechanism (through the disclosure), this in itself has an upward effect 
on intention to purchase. From the literature on reference price research, it can be 
derived that this upward effect may also relate to purchase quantity, category pur-
chase, purchase-timing and store choice (Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). If, how-
ever, consumers are confronted with a more confusing indication of the potential 
effect of the behavioral pricing mechanism (‘higher/lower than the price offered to 
others’), the message seems to dampen their enthusiasm and intention to purchase. 
In this way, we answer to a call by Seizov et  al. (2019, p. 149) who criticize the 
European legislator for disregarding scholarship on effective information design, 
and who recommend ‘empirically tested, interdisciplinary criteria for the design 
of effective disclosures online, with a focus on their application in the EU,’ since 
‘without clear guidance as to how disclosures should be formulated, traders are left 
open to accidental or purposeful obfuscation.’ If corroborated by further research, 
the findings of our two studies should heed policymakers to carefully consider the 
framing and phrasing of mandated disclosure.
Second, a significant effect was found on both the direct measure (i.e., intention 
to purchase) and the indirect measure (i.e., probability to purchase). The magnitude 
of this effect was similar (medium) for both intention to purchase and probability 
to purchase (Cohen’s d = 0.20, resp. d = 0.22). In the context of the dependence of 
consumer decisions (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2011), we thereby contribute 
to the information regulation literature by providing robust evidence of the framing 
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effect. This is an important methodological contribution, as Mattilaand Choi (2014) 
found distinct differences in consumers’ responses to online behavioral discrimina-
tory pricing policy.
Implications for Policy
In light of concerns about the effectiveness of mandated disclosure (Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, 2014; Mercer, Palmiter, & Taha, 2010), we believe that the finding that 
the information disclosure frame increases intention to purchase—particularly the 
extent to which the information hints toward self-interest in purchasing—is of spe-
cial interest. It suggests the possibility that framing as a result of regulatory inter-
vention may inadvertently appeal to consumers’ wishes, desires, and in the process 
of doing so, increase the likelihood of (over)spending. Regulatory intervention 
should at least be partially concerned with raising consumers’ resilience to the use 
of personal information by marketers to stimulate the buying intentions. By disclos-
ing particular information, regulatory interventions may be at risk of playing into 
the hands of marketers rather than the consumer. The call for regulatory intervention 
may thus not only imply a regulation of marketing, but may also give rise to an inter-
est in the road-testing of disclosure regulations. As online retailers are increasingly 
capable of behavioral pricing (Gelbrich, 2011; Kannan & Kopalle, 2001), there may 
be a need for a legal psychological approach, sooner than later.
Limitations and Further Research
We also draw attention to some limitations of our study and directions for research. 
First, while a student sample—in comparison to a non-student one—may have 
brought relatively more homogeneity within the measurement scales, it may have 
also reduced the magnitude of differences among the variables (Peterson, 2001). 
Thus, we explicitly emphasize the importance of replicating this study with a mixed 
sample before making further generalizations. Second, the effects of information 
regulation were measured on the purchase intention of a widely available hospital-
ity service product. The magnitude of behavioral effects may be different for the 
purchase of for example a technically complex product or for a product with a large 
financial commitment. Third, as purchase intentions (i.e., stated preferences) do not 
necessarily lead to actual purchases (i.e., revealed preferences), further experimen-
tal research should explore the effect of disclosure frames on actual buying behav-
ior. Fourth, the framing of a different attribute could be manipulated, for example, 
by disclosing how behavioral data are used for search discrimination purposes (i.e., 
steering consumers toward different choice sets when they search online within a 
specific product category). This would allow finding out whether the salience effect 
of disclosure is robust, or distinct to price.
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